Oh Mugabe, You Lovable Scamp

“‘If we could work with members drawn from the Rhodesia front that oppressed us, what was there to prevent us from working with him?’ Mr. Mugabe asked, laying his hand on Mr. Tsvangirai’s arm.

Mr. Tsvangirai, who has survived at least two assassination attempts in Zimbabwe, remained inscrutable and for several seconds, the room fell silent. Mr. Mugabe only smiled broadly.

“This young fellow… of mine,’ he added, patting his arm. He coaxed another laugh from Mr. Tsvangirai and the audience.”

Via.

Ethiopia and Eritrea Still Not BFFs

Via Sahel Blog, it looks like the two countries that fought one of the more significant interstate wars of the 90s and early oughts are back at each other's throats.

Ethiopia has elections coming up later this month (which aren't expected to particularly free or fair) and is accusing its rival to the north of attempting to destabilize the country in the run up to those elections. The government claims that "Eritrean agents" were behind a bomb that went off in Adi Haro this past weekend and that Eritrea is supporting anti-Ethiopian activity by both the Oromo Liberation Front, an Ethiopia-based ethnic nationalist group, and the notorious Somali Islamist group, al-Shabab.

Meanwhile, the Eritrean regime is now under fire from insurgent groups itself, including the fairly awesomely named Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization, that are based in and receive support from Ethiopia.

This new round of disputes between the two states seems to closely resemble the long-running (and recently ended, tentatively) Chad-Sudan feud, where each side supported anti-government rebels against the other.

Sudanese Elections: Backstory and Future Prospects

Awesome noted on the blog earlier this week that indicted international war criminal/president Omal al-Bashir won reelection and that Salva Kiir had similarly cruised to reelection as vice president and (thus) president of the Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan. I've followed this election somewhat closely and wanted to throw in my $.02 on the situation in Sudan.

First, the elections were pretty much a sham. Go over to the Enough Project and read all about the abuses and irregularities perpetrated by the ruling party (or watch videos of the vote being rigged) or go read about all of the problems with the process listed by the Carter Center.

However, no one is making much of a fuss over this because...

a) Most of the opposition candidates did not participate, so there weren't really many choices for voters. This includes the candidate that was going to be put forward by the leading party in the South, the SLPA/M. The calculus by the SLPM seems to be...what's the point? Why worry about national elections when we are just going to secede next year?

b) As far as I can tell, the US and other Western governments seem to have made similar calculations--something like: yes, we could raise a big stink over these elections, but we want to stay on Bashir's good side in order to have at least a shot at a peaceful secession process next year (it seems fairly certain that the South will vote to secede).

There are a couple of problems with this prognosis by Southern Sudan and by the West. First, it presumes that Bashir will follow through with a fair referendum process next year and, if the South votes to secede, he will allow them to do so peacefully. This seems wildly optimistic given his past antics and the fact that huge issues such as border demarcation and oil revenues remain unresolved. For its part, Southern Sudan seems to be hedging its bets in order to force Bashir to think long and hard before trying to re-ignite the North-South Civil War that raged from the 80s all the way up until the CPA in '05.

But even assuming all goes as planned, a newly independent Southern Sudan faces seemingly insurmountable development obstacles including:
-crushing poverty (I've heard estimates that it would be the poorest country in the world)
-sporadic but deadly intercommunal violence
-periodic incursions by the Lord's Resistance Army
-landlocked with (mostly) bad neighbors, including Bashir's state, whose proximity will likely lead to very high military spending by the new state
-resource curse problems (with oil)
-likelihood of a one-party state dominated by the SPLA/M

Convalescing West African Leaders Emerge

I have written previously about how Moussa Dadis Camara and Umaru Yar'Adua, the junta leader of Guinea and President of Nigeria, respectively, are both out of country for medical reasons. Camara was being treated in Morocco for a gunshot wound to the head. Yar'Adua is being treated in a Saudi medical facility for an unknown illness.

Both leaders have emerged in recent days. As I mentioned in a previous post, Yar'Adua issued a statement recently confirming that he is still alive (although there has been some controversy over whether the recorded statement was actually his voice). His absence is becoming quite problematic for Nigeria. Protests recently broke out over his absence, and now the issue of transition is being taken to court.

Meanwhile, Camara has been moved from Morocco to Burkina Faso, and it seems that he is purposefully being kept out of the country while the interim junta leaders prepares for some kind of transition toward more democratic rule. Overall, it seems that Camara's absence from Guinea is much more of a positive development than Yar'Adua's, which has been almost entirely detrimental.

Another Step Toward Unraveling in the Niger Delta

I've written about the possibility of renewed conflict in the Niger Delta a couple of times in the past. My last post on the topic was quite recent and was related to an attack by Delta militants on an oil facility in the region. This was one of MEND's (and related groups') principle M.O. when the conflict was in full swing, so the recent attack was a bad portent for the likelihood of continued peace in the region along with the fact that MEND said that it had "sanctioned" the attack.

Well, the other principle M.O. for Delta militants was kidnapping oil company employees. And today's news out of Nigeria is, yep, you guessed it, that 3 Britons and 1 Colombian employed by Shell Oil have been kidnapped on their way to work in the Delta. A Nigerian who was guarding them was killed in the course of the kidnapping (it says a lot about the working conditions of oil workers in the region that they have to have armed escorts to get to work).

Hopefully, these two attacks are just a blip and not a sign of worse things to come.

As I wrote about in my last post, much of the current spike in tension is related to the health situation of President Yar'Adua. Today's hopeful news is that the president, who has been incommunicado for some time now in a Saudi Arabia medical facility, finally broke his silence in an interview with the BBC:

At the moment I am undergoing treatment, and I'm getting better from the treatment. I hope that very soon there will be tremendous progress, which will allow me to get back home.

Nigeria on the Brink

While the lion's share of media coverage of Nigeria as of late has been focused on the Fruit of the Loom Bomber, the possibility of renewed conflict in the Niger Delta (and the fact that the region's troubles have been keeping about 1/3 of the country's revenues off of global oil markets) is a much more significant threat to regional and international security than terrorism originating from Nigeria. When I wrote my last post on Nigeria in mid-December, the fragile ceasefire between Abuja and MEND, the umbrella organization for Delta militant groups, was growing increasingly precarious and MEND has reportedly attacked a pipeline in the region as a warning to the government.

Well, it hasn't gotten better since then. Yesterday, a Chevron pipeline was attacked by unidentified gunmen in the Delta region. While MEND hasn't claimed responsibility for the raid, the group does say that it sanctioned the attack. These types of attacks on oil industry facilities were occurring with great regularity this past summer during the height of an offensive by the government's Delta Joint Task Force. The attacks had basically halted completely since the ceasefire (accompanied by an amnesty for militants) went into effect around the summer's end.

One of major factors exacerbating tensions here, which I alluded to in the last post but didn't discuss in detail, is the health of President Yar'Adua. To put it succinctly, it isn't really clear whether the president is actually alive and, if he is, whether he is actually well enough to run the country. It seems to be basically common knowledge in Nigeria that Yar'Adua is quite sickly. He has been receiving medical care in Saudi Arabia and hasn't appeared in public for some time now, leading to, as one might expect, all sorts of speculation, including claims that his signature has been forged on official documents.

What does Yar'Adua's health have to do with conflict in the Delta? Many of the recent peace negotiations between the government and militant groups are centered around personal assurances and promises from Yar'Adua. As the uncertainty surrounding Yar'Adua has increased, MEND has become increasingly skeptical of government promises and stepped up its hostility.

Yar'Adua's health predicament also has the potential of creating a national ethno-religious dilemma. Since its transition away from military rule in 1999, Nigeria has alternated between Southern Christian and Northern Muslim presidents (Yar'Adua is a Northern Muslim; the previous president, Obasanjo, was a Southern Christian). Yar'Adua's death would turn the presidency over the VP, the awesomely-named Goodluck Jonathan, and the Northern Muslims would lose much of their "turn" in charge.

Some Hopeful Signs Out of Guinea

Couple of hopeful news items out of Guinea. It looks like junta leader, Camara, getting shot in the head by an aide was probably a very good development for the country. The interim military leader, Sekouba Konate, seems to have no designs on staying in power, is talking about forming a new unity government, and says a Prime Minister drawn from the opposition would be acceptable. It also looks like ECOWAS, the West African IGO, is putting pressure on the junta to quickly transition toward a more democratic rule (following a little strategic sabre-rattling).

How Did Eritrea Become a Villain?

This post is related to Frosty's recent post.

With the young state of Eritrea poised to join the ranks of UN-sanctioned international pariah states such as Sudan, North Korea, and Iran due to its support of Al-Shabab in Somalia, it is worth considering how it got to this point. Mark Leon Goldberg at UN Dispatch provides some background:

It all began in 2000, when Eritrea and Ethiopia, exhausted from war, decided to end their bloody border dispute by submitting to international arbitration. When the arbiters in the Hague handed down their ruling, they awarded the key disputed territory to Eritrea. End of story, right? Wrong. Ethiopia simply refused to withdraw and a stalemate ensued.

A changing international scene did not help things. The Clinton administration was instrumental in forging the original settlement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But by the time of the arbitration ruling, September 11 had already occurred and the Bush administration was focused on leveraging the support of Ethiopia on terrorism issues in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, the United States was reluctant to press Ethiopia to abide by the ruling.

From an Eritrean perspective, you can see how this might be unsettling. Asmara had agreed to binding international arbitration, but the international community was apparently unwilling to enforce the ruling. Caught in the middle were a few thousand UN Peacekeepers along the border, acting as a buffer between the two armies.

As Eritrea's understandable frustration with the international community grew, Asmara began to lash out in patently unhelpful ways. It kicked out UN Peacekeepers by blocking their shipments of petrol and food; made threatening statements aganst top American officials; attacked neighboring Djibouti; and supported a faction opposed to the internationally-backed Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.

Asmara has also moved closer to Tehran in recent years, according to some reports.

So what lesson do we take away from all of this? It looks like the situation is somewhat similar to as well as closely related to the problems Frosty diagnosed in Somalia. The War on Terror mentality, the Bush Administration's "with us our against us" mentality, and the too-close relationship with Ethiopia seem to have screwed us here, just as in Somalia. By backing our "ally" Ethiopia unconditionally, just as in its invasion of Somalia in 2006, and ignoring the World Court ruling, we undermined international norms and institutions and created backlash that ended up being even more problematic (just as removing the ICU in Somalia led to the rise of Shabab). I guess Ethiopia is a loyal and submissive client, but it doesn't seem like the relatively authoritarian Zenawi regime is our best option as an East African proxy.

Obscure War Blogging Part III: Western Sahara War

For the next installment in our series, we move from the jungles of Indochina to the hot sands of the Sahara...

Who?: Morocco and Mauritania versus the Polisario Front, a national liberation group representing the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara (the Sahrawi aren't really an ethnic group, it's more of a nationalist term adopted by the people of Berber and Arab heritage living in the region).

When?: 1973-1991

Toll: About 10-15,000 total battle deaths, with Morocco, Mauritania, and the Sahrawi suffering relatively evenly. The war also precipitated a major refugee crisis among the Sahrawi.

Why?: Imperialism, nationalism, colonialism, power politics, ideology, outside interference, Arab-African tension--all of these factors played significant roles in igniting or exacerbating the war.

Spain, a minor European power by the end of the 19th century, claimed a protectorate over what became the Spanish Sahara at the Berlin Conference. It originally just claimed control over the coast, but gradually spread its control to include all of the territory. There were periodic revolts against Spanish rule throughout the 20th century. The Polisario Front, a Sahrawi nationalist group, formed in Morocco and in 1971 and launched an insurgency in Western Sahara. The Polisario raided Spanish outposts in the desert and drew major support from the local population. Spain began to negotiate its withdrawal in 1975.

























Things were looking up for the Polisario, but this success was short-lived. Spain negotiated a secret deal with Morocco and Mauritania that became the Madrid Accords in 1976. The more powerful Morocco got about 2/3 of the territory and Mauritania got the other 1/3. The territory was divided despite a World Court ruling that popular opinion in Western Sahara was completely against Spanish, Moroccan, or Mauritanian control. Spain was able to maintain a stake in the territory's lucrative trade in phosphates despite its withdrawal (these resources were located in what now became Moroccan-controlled territory).

For its part, Morocco had historic claims to the area based on control by powerful ancient Moroccan kingdoms. The idea of re-establishing "Greater Morocco" had become fashionable in Moroccan politics following its independence from France.

Mauritania's position on Western Sahara was somewhat schizophrenic due to its fear of Morocco. At times, Nouakchott had favored an independent Sahrawi state as a buffer between it and its more powerful neighbor. However, when Spain withdrew, Mauritanian leadership decided that it would be best to work with Morocco rather than against it.

As with almost every conflict during this period, there was also a Cold War angle. The Polisario, which declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) following Spanish withdrawal, enjoyed the support and assistance of Algeria (and later, Libya), which was pretty firmly in the Soviet, socialist camp during the Cold War. Not surprisingly then, the other side enjoyed the support of the US and the area's former colonial bigwig, France.

Outcome: The Polisario, based in western Algeria, continued to develop the insurgency from within Western Sahara and also began to conduct guerilla raids into both Morocco and Mauritania. The effect on the weaker Mauritania (its armed forces only numbered about 3,000) was particularly strong. The Polisario raids, combined with ethnic unrest between conscripted black Africans and Arab leadership, led to a coup in 1978 that brought down the government in Nouakchott. In 1979, Mauritania relinquished all claims to Western Sahara, pulled out, and recognized the SADR.

This was something of a pyrrhic victory for the Sahrawi, though, because Rabat immediately took control of the area formerly controlled by Mauritania. Fighting also became bogged down as Morocco built a massive, 2700 km-long sand berm--replete with mines and electronic sensors--separating Polisario controlled areas from phosphate-rich Moroccan controlled areas. This halted the success of the Polisario and separated them from much of the Sahrawi population. Maintaining the Moroccan Wall, however, was quite expensive for Morocco--the number of military forces posted there was about equal to the entire population of Western Sahara--although this was alleviated to some extent by American & Saudi aid. Raids, sniper attacks, & shelling continued, but generally at a low level.

A UN-monitored ceasefire was agreed to in 1991 on the condition that a referendum would eventually be held, but Morocco eventually withdrew. Many Sahrawi today live in refugee camps in Algeria, and Morocco doesn't want them to vote. Morocco has, at the same time, sent a significant number of settlers into Western Sahara to shore up its position. Another UN settlement attempt in 2003 spearheaded by former Secretary of State James Baker also failed.

Who Cares?: This conflict really isn't over so much as frozen. It doesn't seem like either side is going to budge anytime soon. The Moroccan monarchy has been able to generate a significant degree of national unity based on the conflict in the "Southern Provinces" and the Sahrawi in the camps in Algeria really don't want to have spent 30 years in refugee camps for nothing.

The conflict has been extremely costly for Morocco and somewhat so for Algeria. For its part, Mauritania has been quite unstable for the past several decades following the coup precipitated by the war (it just went through another coup last year). The conflict has slowed regional economic integration and made foreign investors much more wary of the area. The entire region has also become a hotbed of illicit activity, including trafficking in people and drugs, due to rampant insecurity.

One other wrinkle on the conflict is that it became a source of Arab-African tension. During the war, the SADR was generally recognized by OAU states (the precursor to today's African Union) while the Arab League tended to support Morocco's claims.

Niger Delta Relapse?

A faction of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has reportedly attacked either a Royal Dutch Shell or Chevron pipeline in the delta region. The Niger Delta Joint Task Force (JTF), the security force tasked with dealing with the region, has yet to confirm the attack. MEND claims that the government is using the poor health of President Yar'Adua, who is receiving medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, to delay reconciliation talks (some officials have called for Yar'Adua's resignation due to his illness). An indefinite ceasefire has been in place since late October. If this attack actually happened, it is the first attack on an oil installation since the ceasefire was put in place.

The ceasefire came after significant conflict during the summer. The JTF launched a major operation against delta militants in May and, in return, MEND, which serves as sort of an umbrella organization for several anti-government groups, launched a relentless campaign against foreign oil company facilities in the region, with attacks occurring on a daily basis.

The Delta Conflict has been a huge drain on Nigeria, which is heavily dependent upon oil for government revenue. It is estimated that the country only produces at about 2/3 of its capacity due to these kinds of attacks and illegal oil bunkering or theft (ingenious bunkerers actually tap directly into pipelines and steal oil). Foreign oil workers have also frequently been kidnapped.

The people of the Niger Delta, such as the Ijaw, have quite legitimate grievances. They are the most resource-rich area of the country, but are plagued by poverty and underdevelopment, despite promises from Nigeria of reinvestment and development. Part of the problem is that Nigeria is that the entire oil sector is terribly corrupt. In fact, it is believed that much of the militancy and theft in the delta is actually connected to local politicians.

The campaign against foreign oil companies actually began as a non-violent movement led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was later tortured and murdered (Shell has been implicated in the murder, and recently settled with Saro-Wiwa's family to the tune of over $15 million). However, the movement became more and more militant as government promises never came to fruition.

This attack could mean that this dark period for Nigeria will continue indefinitely. Hopefully cooler heads will prevail.

The Perils of Peacekeeping in the DRC

The New York Times has unearthed documents that demonstrate that MONUC, the UN "peacekeeping" force in the DRC (and the largest such force in the world) went ahead with joint a operation with the DRC's military (FARDC)--dubbed Kimia II--despite warnings by UN legal advisors that FARDC was likely to engage in significant abuses during the operation. MONUC provided crucial logistical support to the operation and, sure enough, the joint operation resulted in major abuses by the FARDC against civilians in Eastern DRC including civilian killings, gang rape, and beheadings.

The purpose of the operation was to crack down on the activities of various predatory militias operating in the east, including the FLDR--remnants of the Rwandan Hutu genocidaires. However, it became clear that, for a variety of reasons, the FARDC was just as predatory as the militias.

One of the major problems with FARDC is that recent attempts to integrate former rebels, including Laurent Nkunda's Tutsi CNDP, into the regular armed forces has not gone smoothly. Many of these former rebels basically continue to act the way they did before only under official military auspices. One of the former rebels leading Kimia II, Jean Bosco Ntaganda (known as "The Terminator"), was wanted by the ICC for war crimes.

It seems self-evident that MONUC should have reconsidered mounting the operation given the warnings from legal advisors, not to mention the fact that undertaking a peacekeeping operation with someone called The Terminator is probably not a good idea. However, it also seems clear that MONUC was motivated by a desire to protect civilians in the east from militias, and that the militias would continue to prey upon civilians absent outside interference.

This demonstrates how difficult such "peacekeeping" operations are in the absence of real peace, and with limited mandates. MONUC was really in a no-win situation in this case. They would be (rightly) criticized for not reigning in the militias if they did nothing, and they are now being (rightly) criticized for working with FARDC after actually deciding to do something.

Renewed North-South Civil War in Sudan Slated for 2011

Take it to the bank.

Sudan already has huge problems. The lingering effects of genocide and insurgency in Darfur. Incursions by the batcrap crazy Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army into the south. Ethnic violence and raids in the south. Now, it look's like a renewed civil war between the northern Muslim-dominated government and breakaway Christian south is likely in the near future.

The festering turd of a government in Khartoum recently showed its hand by rounding up southern politicians from the southern SPLM (the political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army--the north's opponent in the civil war, and the junior partner in the current Sudanese ruling coalition) at an anti-government rally in the capital.

A referendum on creating an independent South Sudan is slated for the summer of 2011, but it is becoming increasingly clear that the government in Khartoum doesn't intend to hold anything resembling a fair election.

For its part, the south is also preparing for war. Satellite imagery and a freight manifest have demonstrated that a freighter captured by Somali pirates last fall and subsequently released was filled with tanks, RPGs, & AA guns headed for the Autonomous Government of South Sudan (via Kenya, who seems to be the GOSS's patron here).

War will (once again) hit Sudan before we know it. Some sort of diplomatic or even military intervention by the international community seems to be the only possible way to avoid this. Is that a good idea? I dunno...

Karma in Guinea

I don't really believe in the supernatural, but recent the recent shooting of the leader of Guinea's ruling junta by his aide de camp might lead some to believe that there is some sort of karmic force at work in the universe.

Guinea junta chief Captain Moussa Dadis Camara was flown to Morocco on Friday for hospital treatment after being wounded in a gun attack by a former military aide, Moroccan authorities said.

Couldn't have happened to a nicer military dictator.

In September, the Guinean junta massacred 157 pro-democracy protesters and perpetrated widespread rape of women who participated in the protests. Camara claims that he wasn't at the rally because he couldn't find the keys to his pickup truck.

There are some rumblings that a) the shootout occurred in relation to investigations surrounding the September massacre and b) that this may spell the end of Camara's brief rule. He is currently undergoing treatment for the wound in Morocco.

Camara's Orwellian-named National Council for Democracy seized power last year amidst some hope that they would usher in a more liberal and democratic future and crack down on the drug trafficking that has plagued the small West African state. That hope quickly faded and it became clear that Camara did not intend on stepping down anytime soon.

Here's hoping that the Camara shooting could be a beginning toward a better path for Guinea.