Another Pakistani "Shift?"

The arrest of Abdul Ghani Baradar and some other leading members of the Afghan Taliban in January was initially seen as a "shift" by Pakistani security forces toward a more anti-(Afghan) Taliban stance that was more in line with what American diplomats and military leaders wanted. Subsequent reports suggested that the arrests may have been motivated by other considerations (for example, the fact that Baradar may have been ready to negotiate with the government; others suggested that it may have been a method by which Pakistan could gain some leverage in any upcoming negotiations).

Now, "Western diplomats and Pakistani security officials" are saying that Pakistan may open up a new anti-insurgent front in North Waziristan. This has been one of the biggest demands of the US for some time now. Pakistan has already mounted offensives in Swat and in South Waziristan, and has suffered considerable military losses and civilian suffering as a result. The government has been hesitant to mount similar operations in North Waziristan, partly for these reasons, and partly because North Waziristan has been more a haven for anti-American/anti-Western forces, such as the Haqqani Network, than for anti-Pakistan forces like the Pakistani Taliban. The US's only way to strike in these areas has been through the use of drones.

Again, though, there is some reason to be skeptical as to whether the US and NATO are really going to get what they want if this offensive does actually happen. The offensive in South Waziristan has caused several anti-Islamabad groups and individuals, including Hakimullah Mehsud (the new leader of the Pakistani Taliban and public enemy number one), to flee to the north. The idea of launching a new offensive is probably more a result of this than Western cajoling. In the event of a Pakistani offensive, it obviously can't be assumed that Pakistani forces will go after the elements that the US and NATO wants it to after.

The Race for Afghanistan

This WaPo article on the Indian-Pakistani competition to solidify and expand their presence in Afghanistan is a must-read for all students of IR. Both of Afghanistan's neighbors seek to cultivate a proxy in Kabul and, at the same time, to prevent their adversary from gaining a proxy there. The article provides some excellent insights into how this process actually plays out on the ground, with, for instance, major electrification projects by Indian engineers and the donation of buses (with Pakistani flags painted on the side) by Islamabad. The article also addresses, to an extent, how this competition affects (and complicates) US policy goals in the region.

QOTD

“What you shooting at, Hoss?”

American Marine to ANA soldier in the Marja offensive. A story in today's NYT reports that many of the Afghan troops active in the operation aren't actually aiming their rifles when shooting.

Question & Track of the Day

Are the Pakistani military and intelligence services the center of gravity in the War in Afghanistan?

AEI: Applying the Lessons of Colombia to Afghanistan

One of the things I've been trying to do more lately is to seriously read and engage the ideas of people and/or groups that I generally disagree with. The American Enterprise Institute has generally been one of those entities because, from my experience, they have generally pushed a military force uber alles approach to foreign policy. That's why I was surprised to read this article from their journal on how COIN lessons taken from the success that Colombia has seen in combating FARC and ELN could be applied to the current situation in Afghanistan.

What surprised me about the article was its minimalist approach. In the past, neoconservative outlets such as AEI have almost invariably advocated a maximalist, all-in, send 8 jillion US troops approach to any given conflict or problem. However, the author of this piece, Haddick, soberly analyzes the similarities and differences between the two conflicts and makes reasonable conclusions regarding applicable lessons that could be applied to the situation.

And here's the kicker...the recommendations are actually quite limited and modest! Haddick recommends an emphasis on quality over quantity in building up Afghan security forces, since this approach worked well against the Colombian insurgents. He also recommends emphasizing helicopters in security assistance to Afghan security forces due to the rough terrain (again, something that worked well for Colombian forces in the rough terrain that they fought in). Finally, he recommends working to develop local security forces since potential soldiers are often loathe to serve far away from their homes.

All of these recommendations are sensible, and the great part is that they don't really require any massive commitment of treasure or personnel on the part of Western governments (although of course the helicopters could be expensive). Score one for the neocon think tank.

Nothing Like Good Old-Fashioned Hypocrisy

Washington Post:

Senate Republicans failed early Friday in their bid to filibuster a massive Pentagon bill that funds the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an unusual move designed to delay President Obama's health-care legislation.

On a 63 to 33 vote, Democrats cleared a key hurdle that should allow them to approve the must-pass military spending bill Saturday and return to the health-care debate. After years of criticizing Democrats for not supporting the troops, just three Republicans supported the military funding...

If the filibuster on the $626 billion defense bill had succeeded, Democrats would have had to scramble to find a way to fund the military operations, because a stopgap funding measure for the Pentagon will expire at midnight Friday. Such an effort to come up with another stopgap defense bill might have disrupted the very tight timeline on health care.

Looks it's perfectly fine to oppose funding the wars on principled grounds. See the section of the article on Russ Feingold for a good example of how this should be done. It's also perfectly fine to oppose the bill due to earmarks, which John McCain is quoted about in the article.

However, it's not fine to oppose the funding because you just want to delay the health care bill. And excuse us if we don't consider your opposition to the bill rooted in good faith when you just spent the last several years screaming about how anyone who voted against a war funding bill was a) with the terrorists and b) against the troops.

As We Stand Down, They'll...Um...Probably Sit There Staring Aimlessly Into Space

Via Walt.

I know that an anecdote doesn't constitute data, but this doesn't look good for the prospects of transitioning toward ANA-led operations in 18 months.

War Bonds & Dumb Senators

To piggyback off of Frosty's post, the recent debate over financing the war in Afghanistan has provided a good window into the complete vapidity of the median member of the United States Senate. The war tax proposal was introduced by Rep. David Obey last month. Obey basically made the argument that we should engage in the same sort of cost-benefit analyses for war that we engage in for domestic policies (cost control, deficit neutrality, etc.). Reasonable people may agree or disagree about the merits of the proposal (I think Frosty makes a pretty good case against it), but it's probably a debate worth having.

Then, enter one Conservadem Ben Nelson:

In lieu of a “war tax” to pay for a troop increase in Afghanistan, Democratic Sen. Ben Nelson (NE) is proposing war bonds.

“We didn’t have a war tax in the second World War,” Nelson said, and instead the government sold Americans bonds. “People invested in their country, in that fashion [and] made a lot of sense back then. I don’t know why it might not make sense today, certainly in lieu of jumping to tax.”

There are a couple things wrong with this. One, we actually did have higher taxes during WW2. Second...well, I'll let Wonkette take it from here:

...this is superfluous, because we already have such bonds: they are called United States Treasury Bonds, which we use to finance any sort of deficit spending! For how many years, as a child, did Ben Nelson drink paint-thinner on a daily basis?...Issuing, say, $30 billion in new “war bonds” means taking on $30 billion in new debt, plus interest. If Ben Nelson wants to be Fiscally Serious, then he should either (a) add a surtax to accumulate $30 billion in new revenue or (b) offset $30 billion in the Defense Department budget, at the expense of other things. That’s probably like four F-35s, seriously. Seriously.

Ben Nelson poops through his mouth.

Well said.

Over at TNR, Jon Chait advances a similar thesis regarding Senator Joe "Eeyore" Lieberman's recent asshattery on health care.

Hate the Surge, Not the Timetable

While I am more or less skeptical of both the necessity and the prospects for success of the new surge plan for Afghanistan, I have a bone to pick with its critics. Much of the criticism of the plan's rollout has centered on the fact that President Obama included a goal of beginning withdrawals in 2011 contingent upon conditions in country.

The standard (usually right-wing) argument (generally made by folks who otherwise "support" sending more troops) goes something like this: "the Taliban will just hole up for 18 months and wait us out." By the way, this same assertion was made a few years back by all of the same usual suspects with respect to Iraq.

Here's why this argument won't fly:

1) One of Al-Qaeda's primary goals is to draw the US into long, open-ended wars and occupations in Muslim countries. Committing ourselves to long, costly occupations plays right into UBL's hands.

2) In COIN warfare, it's important to make it clear to the population that you don't intend to occupy indefinitely. Withdrawal timelines (predicated upon achievable benchmarks) are clear signals that you don't intend to be a permanent occupier. For more on this, see David Edelstein's journal article "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail."

3) With a less than desirable client like the Afghan government, a deadline could serve them to actually get their butts in gear. They need us more than we need them. See here.

4) Again, one common argument is that the insurgents will just lie low and wait us out. As SecDef Gates said, if so, awesome! This would give more time to prepare local forces to take over, spare American troops, and give time to consolidate gains.

Armchair Generalist expands upon this:

- Order would be restored.. Afghani government and Coalition order, not Taliban order.

- Afghani security forces would continue to get training. Expansion of security forces would create jobs.

- Infrastructure creation could begin in earnest. Currently more is spent on security for infrastructure programs than for construction. Infrastructure creation requires labor.

18 months will peal away quickly but it's more than enough time to dull the desire for Taliban-style stability.

18 months of work for locals, real jobs will certainly be preferable to getting shot at.

None of this is to say that there aren't plenty of reasons to criticize the Afghan surge! Critics should just do so in more well thought out manner. See, for example, Juan Cole.