Terror in Times Square! Some Initial Thoughts

So, a few things that I've noticed or been surprised by in all of the reports coming out on the guy who tried to bomb Times Square:

1) When the Pakistani Taliban initially claimed responsibility for the attack, I scoffed. After all, the TTP is a local group based in the tribal areas with parochial concerns that had focused all of its are against the Pakistani government in the past. I was wrong.

It looks like the TTP has "internationalized" due to the presence of Al Qaeda in its stomping ground and, I would presume, because of the US drone war. Of course, if Shahzad did have connection to the TTP, it's still unclear whether the group's role in the attempted attack was operational or simply motivational. This is speculation, but I wouldn't be surprised if Shahzad's radicalization resulted at least in part from anger over US attacks in Pakistan, since he had been such a model US citizen up until recent years.

This is not to "blame the victim," but simply to recognize the phenomenon that Robert Wright has pointed to--that invading or otherwise attacking Muslim countries is going to result in some blowback. Nidal Malik Hassan was motivated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is speculation that Najibullah Zazi may have been motivated by the drone war. The double agent who bombed the CIA base in Khost was angry over US support for Israel in the Gaza War (Operation Cast Lead).

None of this is a direct comment on the propriety of these policies (although they should be vigorously questioned), but simply an acknowledgment that there are "side effects" to foreign policy decisions, and that these should be included in the cost-benefit analysis.

2) As Armchair Generalist has so eloquently pointed out, the fact that Shahzad is being charged with attempted use of WMD is patently ridiculous. If a couple cans of gas and some fireworks can constitute a WMD, then the term has gone far beyond jumping the shark and descended into parody. Here's the federal statute in question.

3) According to the FBI, Shahzad was initially interrogated without being Mirandized under a "public safety exception." I didn't know that such an exception existed. It would seem to render most of the objections to Mirandizing terror suspects in the name of sniffing out impending attacks and other intelligence gathering purposes moot. After the FBI agents determined that there were no impending threats related to Shahzad, he was Mirandized and treated like other suspects (and continued cooperating).

Another Pakistani "Shift?"

The arrest of Abdul Ghani Baradar and some other leading members of the Afghan Taliban in January was initially seen as a "shift" by Pakistani security forces toward a more anti-(Afghan) Taliban stance that was more in line with what American diplomats and military leaders wanted. Subsequent reports suggested that the arrests may have been motivated by other considerations (for example, the fact that Baradar may have been ready to negotiate with the government; others suggested that it may have been a method by which Pakistan could gain some leverage in any upcoming negotiations).

Now, "Western diplomats and Pakistani security officials" are saying that Pakistan may open up a new anti-insurgent front in North Waziristan. This has been one of the biggest demands of the US for some time now. Pakistan has already mounted offensives in Swat and in South Waziristan, and has suffered considerable military losses and civilian suffering as a result. The government has been hesitant to mount similar operations in North Waziristan, partly for these reasons, and partly because North Waziristan has been more a haven for anti-American/anti-Western forces, such as the Haqqani Network, than for anti-Pakistan forces like the Pakistani Taliban. The US's only way to strike in these areas has been through the use of drones.

Again, though, there is some reason to be skeptical as to whether the US and NATO are really going to get what they want if this offensive does actually happen. The offensive in South Waziristan has caused several anti-Islamabad groups and individuals, including Hakimullah Mehsud (the new leader of the Pakistani Taliban and public enemy number one), to flee to the north. The idea of launching a new offensive is probably more a result of this than Western cajoling. In the event of a Pakistani offensive, it obviously can't be assumed that Pakistani forces will go after the elements that the US and NATO wants it to after.

The Race for Afghanistan

This WaPo article on the Indian-Pakistani competition to solidify and expand their presence in Afghanistan is a must-read for all students of IR. Both of Afghanistan's neighbors seek to cultivate a proxy in Kabul and, at the same time, to prevent their adversary from gaining a proxy there. The article provides some excellent insights into how this process actually plays out on the ground, with, for instance, major electrification projects by Indian engineers and the donation of buses (with Pakistani flags painted on the side) by Islamabad. The article also addresses, to an extent, how this competition affects (and complicates) US policy goals in the region.

Question & Track of the Day

Are the Pakistani military and intelligence services the center of gravity in the War in Afghanistan?