QOTD

Senator John Kerry, in a Senate hearing on the new START:

During the question-and-answer period, Sen. Jim DeMint, a first-term Republican from South Carolina, who's up for re-election this year, said he found it "frightening" that the Russians believe there's a relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear forces.

The committee's chairman, Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., patiently noted, "There is a relationship." If offensive forces are cut and defensive forces go up, "you can obliterate one party's sense of deterrence." This, he said, is "common sense."

DeMint said, "But you're agreeing with me." Don't we want to expand our defenses so that we can obliterate Russia's offensive capability?

Kerry, a bit nonplussed, replied, "No."

The Simpsons Do Nuclear Scares and the Surveillance State

I'm not sure if anyone watches The Simpsons anymore. I know the quality has gone down from its peak, but it's still better than most of the other stuff on the teevee. Anyway, last night's episode, "To Surveil With Love," poked fun at nuclear alarmism and surveillance in the name of national security. My favorite line probably came from Mayor Quimby when they were holding a vote on whether to establish widespread camera surveillance in a vote at city hall.

Quimby: All those in favor say aye!

*everyone but Lisa says aye*

Quimby: All those opposed say I...hate America!

Lisa: Aye...umm...

Gates' Nuclear Iran Memo

A lot to chew on here, hope to have a post up on this sometime soon.

(Incorrect) QOTD

From Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Ellen Tauscher, on some of the hangups in the new START talks:

This agreement is about strategic offensive systems. Missile defense is a defense system.

Not really.

DOOMSDAY!

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists at the University of Chicago are set to reset the Doomsday Clock tomorrow. We are currently at 5 minutes to midnight, which is pretty darn dire. I'm not sure which way they'll go. Many of the problems identified at the last reset have calcified or become worse, but they may be hopeful about the new impetus for non-proliferation in the US.

Some Positive Signs on Iran & Nukes

While I have generally been pessimistic about what the endgame in the standoff between Iran and the West over the former's nuclear program will be, an article in today's NYT provides some--well maybe not hope, but some positive signs for both the direction of the nuclear program and US policy:

1. First, it looks like the Obama Administration has convinced Israel to hold off attacking Iran.

[An] administration official said that Israeli officials, while still publicly hinting that they might take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, “now feel that what’s happening in Iran makes the country vulnerable to real sanctions,” and might give Mr. Obama more time to persuade China and Russia to go along. A senior Israeli diplomat in Washington said that in back-channel conversations “Obama has convinced us that it’s worth trying the sanctions, at least for a few months.”

I'm pretty skeptical that Russia and China will ever "go along," but I think that war or air strikes would probably be the worst option possible here. I think it's pretty obvious why war would be bad. Air strikes, while seemingly a more benign option, would a) kill civilians, b) not be certain to end the nuclear program, c) strengthen Iran's resolve to pursue nukes, and d) alienate the Greens, who are Iranian nationalists first. So, I think the fact that attacks are unlikely to occur soon is a good thing.

2. Second, it seems that things aren't looking so hot for the prospects of the Iranian nuclear program in general. There are a number of reasons for this:

a) the Qom site revelation

...the Obama administration officials said they believed that the bomb-development effort was seriously derailed by the exposure three months ago of the country’s secret enrichment plant under construction near the holy city of Qum. Exposure of the site deprived Iran of its best chance of covertly producing the highly enriched uranium needed to make fuel for nuclear weapons...

American officials say that the Qum plant is now useless to the Iranians. “They spent three years and tens of millions of dollars on a covert plant that they will probably never turn on,” said the senior official involved in the White House strategy.

b) "technical problems"

...international nuclear inspectors report that at Iran’s plant in Natanz, where thousands of centrifuges spin to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel, the number of the machines that are currently operating has dropped by 20 percent since the summer, a decline nuclear experts attribute to technical problems.

...administration officials and experts say that another factor slowing Iran’s nuclear development is that it is working with older centrifuge technology that keeps breaking down.

By the recent count of inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency, there were 3,936 centrifuges running at Iran’s enrichment plant in the desert at Natanz — down from a peak of 4,920 centrifuges in June.

Administration officials say Iran began producing almost all of its own centrifuge components after discovering that the United States and other Western countries had sabotaged some key imported parts, and they have made a series of manufacturing errors.

R. Scott Kemp, a Princeton University physicist, said that another factor was in the basic design of the centrifuges, obtained from Pakistan nearly two decades ago. “I suspect design problems,” Mr. Kemp said. “The machines run hot and have short lives. They’re terrible. It’s a really bad design.”

If Mr. Kemp and others are right, it suggests that Iran has a long way to go before it can make good on its recent vow to open 10 new enrichment plants. Iranian officials have said publicly that those plants will use a new version of the centrifuges. But Paul K. Kerr, a nuclear analyst at the Congressional Research Service, said research on the new generation of centrifuges had apparently proved “less successful” than the original, primitive design.

c) pushing back of the "breakout window"

These factors have led the administration’s policy makers to lengthen their estimate of how long it would take Iran to accomplish what nuclear experts call “covert breakout” — the ability to secretly produce a workable weapon.

“For now, the Iranians don’t have a credible breakout option, and we don’t think they will have one for at least 18 months, maybe two or three years,” said one senior administration official at the center of the White House Iran strategy.

3. Third, the Obama Administration seems poised to pursue sanctions targeted against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The White House wants to focus the new sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the military force believed to run the nuclear weapons effort.

While I'm not all that convinced that sanctions are the key to success here, this seems to be the best possible target for any new sanctions. The IRGC is a major economic player in Iran and targeting their transactions and front companies could hurt them without alienating the reformers. Unfortunately, Congress does still seem poised to pass counterproductive gas sanctions this year that could cancel out any positive effects from the IRGC sanctions.

4. Fourth, we're probably using covert action, and it's probably working!

Others, including some European officials, believe the problems may have been accentuated by a series of covert efforts by the West to undermine Iran’s program, including sabotage on its imported equipment and infrastructure.

Another possible problem for Iran is the Western sabotage efforts. In January, The New York Times reported that President Bush had ordered a broad covert program against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including efforts to undermine electrical and computer systems that keep the nuclear program running. The Obama administration has been silent about the progress of that program, one of the most heavily classified of the United States government.

I think some on the left probably would have a problem with this, but this seems to me exactly the type of situation where covert action is useful (rather than manipulating political events and overthrowing leaders).

5. In conclusion, the new formula for dealing with Iran & nukes seems to be becoming:

Diplomacy+Targeted Sanctions+Covert Action-(Sabre Rattling+Bluster)

I think that, overall, this may be the best possible approach to dealing with an incredibly difficult situation.

Really?

Today over at Obsidian Wings (normally one of my favorite blogs), Robert Mackey tries to make the case for manned nuclear bombers. His argument seems to boil down to three parts. 1) Jobs! 2) Awesomeness! and 3) ....

It's hard to characterize his main argument, but it seems to be that he prefers bombers because they can be recalled once they are sent off. This seems reasonable at first glance. After all, who doesn't want the ability to avert thermonuclear war? Who doesn't want the ability to say "never mind" after the bombers are on their way. It does seem strange that both subs and ICBMS can get everything done in less time than it takes to get across some towns. Wouldn't it be better if everyone had time to cool down and talk things out?

There's only one problem with this. Under what circumstances would we launch NUCLEAR WEAPONS where there was still room for discussion? If we are using nuclear weapons as a deterrent, then our use of nukes is simply to respond to an attack. To hit them as hard as they hit us (or harder), so that they and everyone else know not to hit us again. If we're actually willing to turn the planes around due to negotiations, that says that we are not using them as a deterrent after all, but instead as nuclear coercion. That we are engaging in a first strike.

He's almost explicit about this.

The nature of submarine warfare and the security of missile sites in the US mean that there will be no "warning" of attack to an adversary to make them negotiate. No, the first time they know the US is serious is when a mushroom cloud appears.

He ends it with:

Short of full nuclear disarmament, however, I'd prefer Slim Pickens flying in a recallable bomber than two guys in a silo in Nebraska with funny keys around their necks.

Recall that, in the end, Slim couldn't be recalled either. These are not weapons to be used for any but the most serious purposes, and you want to be damned sure you know what's going to happen when you do. Give me subservient computers and the guys with the keys around their necks.